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  Introduction 
 
This is an article about openness, corporeal situatedness and looking. 
The impulse for the writing stems from a particular interest in the relationship of the solo improviser 
to both the explicit contours and unrealized potentialities of her corporeal situation. From the 
multitude of both internal and external stimuli to which an improviser may respond at any moment, 
I am choosing to zoom in here on questions of how the occupation of space may be understood and 
articulated. The significance of precise corporeal positioning within particular, delineated 
surroundings is explored and the improvisational impetus towards disclosure and revelation is 
posited as a form of interrogative exploration.  
My improvisational practice, which began by studying with Al Wunder 
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in Melbourne and is now, 10 
years later, situated primarily in a small town in the North of England, is concerned with the 
interaction between the improviser and the processes of improvising. The improvisations I make and 
watch are poised at the centre of the research and the theorizing. The shift in my geographical 
location is one impetus behind an interest in situation and context, but it is also one of the concerns 
to emerge most strongly from the investigations of my larger practice-led doctoral project into the 
tropes and characteristics of the solo, open mode.  The complexities (and richness) of inter-
performer dynamics within duet and ensemble forms is deliberately by-passed in order to focus on 
the situation of the individual performer. Hence the relationship of that performer to his material, 
his processes and his environment – which includes material aspects of the space and interpersonal 
relationship with audiences - become key overall concerns.  
In phenomenological vein my knowledge and discoveries depend on the immediate experience of 
improvising, my conclusions stem from embodied practice, felt and shared. To give a sense of this, I 
have included studio writings from my on-going research with Andrew Morrish – small pieces of 
‘poetic’ reflection written immediately after solo improvisations by both improviser and observers, 
designed to ‘capture’ something of the preceding performance. I have also inserted quotes from a 
project conducted in 2006 which add the conversational voice of the improviser as an adjunct to the 
more theoretical and discursive language.
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When I refer, loosely, to the term phenomenology, I am referring to existential phenomenology, 
particularly as espoused in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961). This philosopher 
explicitly placed ‘what I live through’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xv11) at the 
centre of his theorizing, insisting, in a clear-cut challenge to Cartesian mind-body dualism, that the 
body functions as the means by which the world is perceived and comes into existence. Rather than 
functioning as ‘an object for an ‘I think’’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 153), the 
body inhabits space and time in an intentional, goal-oriented manner in which  ‘consciousness is in 
the first place not a matter of “I think” but of ‘I can’”. (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, 137) 
This notion of ‘I can’ as the body’s ‘basic intentionality’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, 137) becomes the means of entering into a dynamic inter-relationship with the 
surrounding environment. Thus we are ‘permanently stationed before things in order to perceive 
them’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 303) and perception is treated as ‘initiation 
into the world.’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 257) In other words, our mode of 
entering into some kind of relationship with our surroundings, our world, is through the corporeality 
of the body. 
                                                           
1
 Al Wunder’s ‘Theatre of the Ordinary’ has been based in Melbourne since 1982. The classes in improvised 
movement theatre ‘use a multi-level class structure that combines the technically developed skills of the 
advance student with innocent and unencumbered creative explorations of the raw beginner.’ 
(http://www.theatreoftheordinary.com) 
2
 Andrew Morrish has been a Research Associate at the University of Huddersfield since February 2006, and 
was appointed as an Honorary Research Fellow in December 2008. He regularly collaborates with John Britton 
and me on a variety of research and performance projects relating to improvisational performance. 
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‘...there was something about trying to 
find the space in a new way...’ 
Hilary Elliott in conversation with 
Andrew Morrish, July 11
th
 2006, 
University of Huddersfield 
In this article I draw on this fundamental tenet by adopting Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of vision as 
an extension of the corporeal in order to highlight some of the ways in which the solo 
improvisational space may be construed. A certain type of looking is equated with an intentionality 
that is purposefully interrogative and that raises questions about the dynamic relationship between 
the improviser, his material and his environment.  
The juxtaposition of phenomenology with the comments of various improvisers is intended to 
present a synthesis of ideas on the ways in which the improviser may engage with his surroundings; 
Merleau-Ponty’s late writings are driven by complex notions of the individual’s ontological relations 
with the world – poetically realized as ‘a relation that is one of embrace’ in some of his working 
notes (Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 271) And, as I will argue, the situation of the solo 
improviser is one in which negotiation with and within particular conditions is a fundamental and 
foundational principle.  
More generally, phenomenology also reaches for enhanced understanding of whatever 
phenomenon is under examination. Part of its aim, in the words of dance academic Sondra Fraleigh, 
is to ‘arrive at meaning, perspectives on the phenomenon of experience...which can be 
communicated.’ (Fraleigh, 11) Thus, in this instance, it is through this reflective process of writing 
that I am seeking to re-visit and map part of the complex operations of the solo improvisational 
form. And, hopefully, get to know it better.  
Unexpectedly perhaps, but indicative of the on-going search for prisms through which aspects of 
movement improvisation can be elucidated, I also refer to the quintessentially clever improvisation 




In solo open form improvisation, the performance intention is to enter 
the space without a pre-determined theme, or a pre-organised score or 
structure. The form asks, challengingly, for a holding back of material, 
ideas and structures until the moment of performance. Of course, when 
the moment of performance begins is open to question and debate - as 
one waits on the side? As one enters? Once one is ‘in’? But, accepting 
this ambiguity around the very beginnings of the piece, the open, solo form is one in which there is a 
stated or implied absence of pre-existing script or set operational rules. Seen in this way, the open 
form is both susceptible to misinterpretation or exaggeration and raises some thorny questions that 
are akin to those confronting phenomenology in its broadest, most ambitious, sense.  
First, to the misinterpretations. If ‘open’ is equated with a kind of unfettered freedom, or structure-
lessness, then the form is erroneously believed or implied to exist beyond boundaries or rules. 
Descriptives such as:  ‘guaranteed ride full of this wild taste of spontaneous delight’ in which 
participants are ‘released into delicious rule-breaking.’(Dilley in Zaporah, xvi) reinforce the notion of 
structure-less abandon. Or, from Roger Copeland who would dismiss  ‘mere improvisation’ for the 
same reasons that  others celebrate it, improvisation is treated as an attempt to ‘break through the 
resistance of {the} rational mind in order to tap the unconscious, “natural” or primitive impulses that 
lie waiting to be unleashed.’(Copeland, 108)  Here improvisation is equated with a kind of 
undisciplined eruption and wildness, even thoughtlessness.  
 
In practice, as most improvisers I have read, spoken to and worked with accept, the open form is 
hardly as unbounded, undisciplined and wild as this. As the philosopher Gary Peters notes about ‘so-
called free improvisations’ - a term that I regard as interchangeable with ‘open’ - the ‘apparent 
freedom of the improviser – the risk taking and spectacle of spontaneity – is rarely the inspired 
abandonment that it appears to be or is promoted as.’ (Peters, 82) Improvising musician Stephen 
Nachmanovitch points out in his aptly titled Free Play: ‘Improvisation always has its rules, even if 
they are not a priori rules...We carry around the rules inherent in our organism.’ (Nachmanovitch, 
26) Or, very explicitly from the doyen of contact improvisation Steve Paxton: ‘It must be noted that 
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‘...what I always say is – there is always a 
structure! Whether or not we can see it as 
structure is another thing...some we recognise 
and some we don’t, but they’re always there.’  
Andrew Morrish, July 12
th
 2006 
Free Improvisation cannot exist, theoretically...The problem is ‘freedom’ is as dependent on 
circumstances as this sort of improvisation must be free of them. To be “free” of a circumstance only 
means to be in another...’ (CQ, 12; 2, 4) 
 
Thus the open form is in fact very explicitly situated within boundaries – what Paxton calls 
‘circumstance’ – and structures.  
If at this point we return to a phenomenologically-inspired framing of the open performance mode 
as one in which the performer attempts to ‘set aside beliefs, biases, explanatory theories and 
hypotheses’ (Spinelli, 25) we see that the open form is further problematised. Whilst the 
performer’s receptiveness to what is present in the space is a characteristic of the form – and one 
that I shall pick up on later – the notion of setting aside one’s own beliefs or biases is less easily 
accounted for. Thus on a superficial level we have a form in which the intent is not to re-play or re-
visit existing narratives, choreographies and character, but rather to generate from the here-and-
now of the performance event. But on a deeper level, the form is clearly circumscribed and bounded 
by the very ‘beliefs’ and ‘biases’ of the performer; they are the filters and foci through which the 
present space is encountered and from which the performance is created. ‘Beliefs’ and ‘biases’ are 
Spinelli’s words, used in the context of explaining phenomenology, but they are useful catch-all 
descriptives for the nexus of circumstance that bounds the open form.  Within this nexus might lie 
our own limitations as performers; there are the tacit rules of operation or expectations that we 
assume before the piece begins; there are conscious or habitual patterns of physical discourse that 
we return to. In an even broader sense, there is any individual’s performance history, life history, 
cultural encodings.  If we follow this line of argument through, we see that a complete ‘openness’ is 
corporeally, mentally and emotionally impossible; the open form, to borrow Paxton’s words, ‘cannot 
exist’. 
  
What is left, then, if the term ‘open’ is accepted as a 
problematic misnomer, is the performative tension and 
improvisational possibility that arises from both an 
acceptance of, and playing within, boundaries and 
between circumstances. It is a construal of the 
improvisational space as one in which an interrogative 
exploration might enable the improviser to accept the parameters of every (shifting) circumstance 
but still embody a generative energy or momentum beyond the sense of limit, of boundary. It is an 
envisioning of space impelled by asking how the improviser maximises the potential or possibility of 
delineated space and contingent moments. 
 
Corporeal Situatedness 
In The Usual Suspects, an interrogating detective borrows a colleague’s office in order to question a 
small-time criminal called Verbal Klint. The film’s narrative unfolds through a series of episodes 
relayed by Klint, and involves the exploits of a fantastically terrifying crime lord, complete with 
unexplained deaths and inter-criminal machinations. When we first see Klint in this office, he is 
sitting silently, extremely composed, looking around him – his eyes linger on a cigarette box and 
they scan the back walls which are busily covered with pieces of paper.  Early on in his interrogation 
he requests coffee and mentions, nonchalantly, that he was once in a barbershop quartet. At the 
end of the first interrogation scene we see him looking at the bottom of the detective’s coffee cup. 
The camera focuses on his eyes. 
In the next scene, we again become aware of his eye movements. Seemingly succumbing to 
interrogative pressure, he confesses the name of a key player in the criminal matrix – a lawyer, 
‘Kobayashi’. Not long after this there is another long, lingering shot on the bottom of the detective’s 
coffee cup as he drinks.   
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‘Placing myself firmly against the wall –  
A decisive move to ‘plant’ myself somewhere 
Look at the light on one side 
And the piece of paper on the other 
Words – looked for, sounded out on the tongue 
Verbal nonsense 
Looking up to see sheets of paper with words 
Then the fact of the paper’s text the light’s label 
and the wall text 
Begin to cascade into verbal and internal 
imagery 
I can always go back to the wall writings 
So I do – it’s like I don’t have to  
Find the original source but the jumble of  
Words becomes a character stuck and highly 
strung’ 
Hilary Elliott, Studio Writings, March 1
st
 2010 
The plot accelerates and plays with our perceptions, though we don’t know this at the time. Only 
retrospectively do we realize that the version of events we see, the version relayed through Klint’s 
tale, is a sophisticated lie.  
It is not, however, the fabrication of an elaborate fiction that is most interesting in the context of 
improvisation. Rather it is what is dramatically revealed in the final 3 minutes of the film through the 
shocked and disbelieving eyes of the detective - the suddenly obvious link between Klint’s 
immediate environment and the details of his story. 
As the detective’s eyes begin to scan the notice-board at the back of his colleague’s office, they fall 
on a small sign – ‘Quartet. Skokie, IL.’ At the same time he remembers Klint talking inanely about 
once being in a barbershop quartet, in Skokie Illinois. Now the detective scans faster, half-
remembered pieces of dialogue suddenly cohering with what he is seeing; a random name on a list 
matches the name of one of the central crime figures of Klint’s narrative; a picture matches a 
description he gave. 
His coffee mug has fallen to the floor and smashed (the nicely cinematic mode of signalling his 
discovery of the truth). As we follow his eyes downwards, we see the inscription ‘Kobayashi’ on its 
broken base. The detective realizes that Klint’s entire story has been concocted from a string of 
randomly placed words and images, suddenly visible to him in all their improvisatory significance.  
 
Verbal Klint is, admittedly, a fictionally ideal improviser, but he illustrates both the limitations and 
capabilities of the situated performer very nicely. Physically bounded by a small, unfamiliar office, he 
doesn’t move from his chair as his eyes take in enough information to construct the contents of his 
story. What he creates is a direct result of the particular view afforded him by his situation in space – 
it simply isn’t possible to ‘see’ more of the room. His corporeal situatedness creates a set of 
conditions that radically affects what is possible ‘now’. Improvisationally he can’t proceed unless he 
takes his current spatial location into account as a defining factor in what may be possible next. 
 
But, to adopt a Merleau-Pontian formulation, what he ‘sees’ is also a result of the ‘art of 
interrogation’ (Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 133) that underpins and infuses his 
corporeal attitude. He is obviously looking for the potential in his situation. In the words of 
improviser Chris Johnston: ‘The improviser is looking for something to respond to, something that 
triggers the imagination and in turn creates emotional engagement. When it’s happening the solo 
improviser becomes like a detective who’s hunting down 
some quarry.’ (Johnston, 110) The interrogative stance reveals 
details, images, words (small, inconsequential things) that 
would otherwise have stayed mute, invisible.  
 
The consequences of our ‘situatedness’ are re-enforced in the 
film by the teasing revelation that the detective, necessarily 
adopting his own situated perspective, misses the most vital 
of all clues - the words ‘Kobayashi’ on the base of his own 
mug. The absoluteness of the ‘here’ that the detective 
occupies does not invite an alternative perspective. Of course, 
the detective could have noticed the clues in the office earlier; 
he could have held his mug up and seen the words on its base, 
but then we would have a rotten drama.   
The movie’s climax leaves one aware of the detective’s 
limitations, the constricting results of his complete immersion 
in his own point of view, dictated by his ‘beliefs, biases, 
explanatory theories and hypotheses’.  If we agree with 
Merleau-Ponty that ‘each one inhabits only his own, sees only 
according to his own point of view, enters into being only 
through his situation’ (Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
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A journey. Moving...always moving 
Exploring by looking at the edges. The edges of the space, the edges of 
the objects in the space. 
Touching and reflecting what is felt. 
The vision leads sometimes. 
Sometimes it feels like a “being with” and sometimes like an inspector’s 
gaze. 
The arms lead sometimes, 
Arcing through the space, causing the torso to rotate in response. 
The feet and legs lead sometimes. 
Creating pathways that allow you to travel from edge to edge. 
A casual restless curiosity propels the journey  
Andrew Morrish, Studio Writings, June 27
th
 2009 
Invisible, 62), then the situatedness, when combined with an unwillingness to look for what might 
not seem evident, closes down other possibilities of ‘seeing’.  
Simultaneously we see Klint’s improvisatory cleverness as a mode of freedom (literally, in fact, as it 
results in him walking out of the police-station). His freedom is not the kind of Dionysian abandon 
associated with improvisation in some discourses but stems from his corporeal grounding in and 
imaginative playing beyond the limited confines of his specific spatial situation.  Although the topic 
of imagination cannot be adequately explored here, it is clearly an operational mode that acts to 
reconceptualise and reconfigure one’s current circumstance: ‘Imagination rubs up against the 
senses, defining and redefining the material world.’ (Zaporah, 261) And this maxim, from Keith 
Johnstone:  ‘that we are not, as we are taught to think, our ‘personalities’, but that the imagination 




As an extension of the corporeal, the improviser’s vision can function in a diffusive or focussed way – 
scanning the environment, noticing an array of details, or lingering, immersed in a particular detail 
or sensation. Vision is both generative – it is a way of finding material or inspiration – and grounding 
– as the things noticed do not have to be explicitly picked up: ‘Don’t react, remain aware continually, 
without interruption. By not reacting, by just noticing, we come to know the “noticer” as separate 
from the experience being noticed...the phenomenological world becomes something to watch.’ 
(Zaporah, 181) 
 
The ability to be open to the stimuli that exist, or may exist, in the space without reacting to them, 
combined with the preparedness to utilise that openness in a constructive, generative way 
characterises the ideal improviser.  Klint, as our model, epitomises the kind of ‘responsiveness’ that 
is axiomatic in improvisatory discourse as an essential skill. Improviser Chris Johnston writes: 
‘Responsiveness therefore begins with noting the auditory, visual or kinaesthetic stimuli that are 
present. With these responses, the aim is to trigger the imagination so as to provoke its progenitive 
ability to spawn its own world within the world of the event.’ (Johnston, 227) And from improvising 
teacher Ruth Zaporah: ‘Action is, in fact, a response. That’s all. To act is to respond to the material of 
one’s awareness: information from the senses, imagination, memory. To act is to enact the current 
experience of awareness as it awares.’ (Zaporah, 154) These formulations are useful reminders that 
responsiveness within improvised performance is not passive; it is not merely a taking-in of data or 
information: ‘Responsiveness, then, is about action that is consequent on awareness.’ (Johnston, 
228) The ideal improvisatory state is responsive, active, attentive and aware. 
 
Whilst agreeing that these are essential 
qualitative states for any improviser, I think 
it is also useful to throw a 
phenomenological light on the improviser’s 
active looking and active responsiveness. To 
briefly generalise Merleau-Ponty’s 
formulations on the interaction between the 
individual and the world, he posits that one 
both perceives the world through 
observation and interaction, and, 
simultaneously, experiences the world 
revealing itself:  ‘The gaze gets more or less 
from things according to the way in which it 
questions them, ranges over or dwells on 
them. (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
6 
 
‘...you are here, there is an 
audience; it’s us and this is 
the situation...’ 




Perception, 153) It is ‘the look that questions the things.’(Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
Invisible, 103) ‘When I ask myself what precisely it is that I see...it is the reply to a certain kind of 
questioning on the part of my gaze.’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 226) ‘My eye 
for me is a certain power of making contact with things...’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, 278/9)  
 
In Merleau-Pontian thought, there is an interactiveness between the gaze - as an extension of the 
corporeal, tactile body - and the world that he claims to be mutually constructive: ‘The world is 
inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the 
subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects.’ (Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 430) It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the 
complexities of what he calls the ‘chiasm’, what we might understand as an overlaying or entwining 
of the world and the individual. But what is useful to consider here is the proposition that the 
individual does not simply actively respond to the sensory stimuli surrounding him, but that, as a 
result of his interrogative stance, he enables what was already present, latent or, to take one of 
Merleau-Ponty’s crucial constructs ‘invisible’, to come to the fore. If we follow this idea through for 
its performative implications, we can posit that the space of the solo improviser becomes one in 
which potential and possibility is both created and enabled; generated and released. Stephen 
Nachmanovitch citing the example of Michelangelo’s theory of sculpture, follows a parallel 
argument when talking of the improviser’s feeling as ‘more like following, or taking dictation’: ‘The 
statue is already in the stone, has been in the stone since the beginning of time, and the sculptor’s 
job is to see it and release it.’ (Nachmanovitch, 4)  
Nachmanovitch, whose writing in Free Play articulates an elegant belief in the processes whereby 
shape, form and music are released, or revealed,  talks of a ‘deep innate patterning of information’ 
as ‘holographically present in whatever we care to look at; not just in Michelangelo’s blocks of 
Carrara marble, but in everything... It is as if there were something underneath this piece of paper, a 
pattern whose outline I am trying to catch and make visible by pointing to it with these words.’ 
(Nachmanovitch, 35) Whether or not one aligns oneself with the ontological dimension of 
Nachmanovitch’s thought – captured in the statement that the ‘ultimate source and destination of 
creative work...lies in the wholeness of the psyche, which is the wholeness of the world.’ 
(Nachmanovitch, 187) - his thinking does point to the significance of revelation and disclosure within 
the improvisatory process; the establishment of a constructive relationship with something external 
to ourselves: ‘The liberation, the awakening to creativity, comes when we can finally see ourselves 
as neither placating nor resisting the universe, but seeing our true relation to it, as part to whole.’ 
(Nachmanovitch, 193) 
 
For the solo improviser, this sense of latent possibility inhering within the improvisational space ties 
in closely with our consideration of questions of boundaries and precise circumstance. The 
limitations of the corporeal self – the specific situatedness, the partiality of the individual’s spatial 
point of view, the impossibility of possessing an absolutely open stance from which everything is 
possible – rub against a sense, or a desire to sense, that there is an open field of possibility as yet 
untapped: ‘The “world” is this whole where each “part”, when one takes it for itself, suddenly opens 
unlimited dimensions..’ (Merleau- Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, notes, 218) 
 
Perhaps this is the condition of the improviser – an ‘indefatigable ranging over 
things’ (Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 103) in order to find the 
unique, dynamic potential of each moment; the ‘inexhaustible depth’ (Merleau-
Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 41) that may exist beneath or beyond our 
customary ‘beliefs and biases’. The improvisational space lends itself to this kind of 
speculation; it is an arena of potential discovery and revelation – about oneself, one’s material, one’s 





 perspective on an improvisation: 
A perpetual motion machine, 
(in itself a holy grail) 
Ticking and whirring 
And provoking itself in 
Turns. And Twists 
And Tortions, 
The room is solid and watchful, 
Unyielding in places 
Soft elsewhere. 
Pillars and floors and walls 
Reject your provocations 
And suggestions that there are other ways 
We could invent of being 
Curtains and strings will go some way with you. 
They’ll take on a little of what you offer 
Try the costume on 
But in the end, their willingness decays 
To watchful stillness. 
Your sound merges with the ebb 
And flow of traffic, wind and memory. 
Outside a red light glows now, 
DO NOT ENTER 
For although you have not altered anything, 
Everything is changed. 
John Britton, Studio Writings, June 27
th
 2009. 
As suggested earlier, however, it is also the quintessential solo experience to be obliged to approach 
that broad (invisible) spectrum through the limits imposed by our corporeal situatedness (and, 
beyond this spatial condition, the temporal conditioning of our histories and our enculturation). In 
acknowledging this tension, improvisation points to an essential, challenging, dilemma at the heart 
of the form: ‘Personal agendas, and the resulting loss of awareness...prevent us from living in the 
present. We allow beliefs to govern our actions, rather 
than our experience of the constant flow of 
change.’(Zaporah, 7) Or, as Merleau-Ponty phrases the 
same conundrum: ‘Open upon the thing itself, the 
perception is no less our own work, because the thing is 
henceforth exactly what we think we see...’ (Merleau-
Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 29) 
In the final analysis, the collision of limit with capacity; of 
boundaries with possibility; of what is pragmatically 
sensed with what simply might be offers a potent field of 
exploration in which the improviser can situate himself 






One of the things most appealing 
about Verbal Klint is the cool 
composure with which he goes about 
improvising his way to freedom. His 
corporeal stillness reinforces the 
darting and seeking movements of his 
eyes; his looking, as Merleau-Ponty might say, ‘envelops, palpates, espouses the visible things.’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 133)  The minute details overlooked by the detective’s 
habitual ways of being are ‘caught’ and improvisationally translated into fiction and freedom. And 
although he is immensely self-assured, the contingency of Klint’s method is nonetheless apparent, as 
he builds an entire reality on the smallest of revelations, against a background horizon of numerous 
other possible eventualities. In this he is both improvisationally astute and, for the purposes of this 
short reflection, a good example of the phenomenological inclination and improvisational leaning 










 perspective on an improvisation: 
Start with small movements in space. Very central 
Surrounded by Space 
Body searches for tactile experiences 
Surfaces of curtain – deeper than I’d expected 
Scratchiness of walls 
I go ‘off’ the black and ‘behind’ where A + J sit 
Driven by touching surfaces 
And looking at smallnesses - switches 
I find a drawing pin and pick it up 
End back in the centre 
Eyes are more awake in this space 
Body feels more fluidly a surface 
Hilary Elliott, Studio Writings, June 27
th
 2009 
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